Sudan: Reflections on the Parallel Gov and the “Vicious Circle” in Sudan

 By Dr. Elshafie Khidir Saeed

The recent developments in Sudan, encompassing the maneuvers of certain armed and civilian political factions toward endorsing a foundational charter to establish a parallel government to that of Port Sudan, constitute a quintessential manifestation and outcome of the vicious circle perpetuating political instability in Sudan—a phenomenon we shall elucidate further within the corpus of this discourse. However, as a preliminary observation, let us acknowledge that the information available regarding these developments and initiatives remains exceedingly sparse, limited primarily to press statements issued before and after the so-called “disengagement” within the dissolved “Taqaddum” alliance, which bifurcated into factions either supportive of or opposed to the notion of a parallel government. Additionally, the Nairobi meeting on February 18 of this year amounted to little more than media spectacle and reiterative oratory concerning the dialectic of “Old Sudan” versus “New Sudan” and the perennial failure to manage diversity.

The pronouncements and speeches of these leaders, rationalizing the formation of a parallel government, assert that it aims to delegitimize the Port Sudan government, shield civilians from the brutality of forces and militias loyal to it, provide services to citizens deprived thereof beyond the Port Sudan government’s zones of control, and ultimately halt the war, foster peace, and preserve national unity. Yet, these justifications confront a litany of principal and subsidiary questions, chief among them being the pragmatic feasibility of their realization. Moreover, they invite a substantive and objective critique suggesting that the outcome of this endeavor is likely, with considerable probability, to contravene the very intentions underpinning these rationales. Nevertheless, we emphatically caution against the oversimplification or premature judgment of these developments through preconceived, formulaic templates, while simultaneously underscoring the imperative of not underestimating their repercussions—not solely for Sudan but for the broader region.

We refrain from delving deeply into an analysis of the parallel government concept prior to a comprehensive review of the project’s intricacies, the specifics of the foundational charter, the government’s agenda, and its implementation mechanisms. Yet, the mere proposition itself compels us to associate it with several cardinal conclusions.

First Conclusion: For the Sudanese citizen, the cessation of war constitutes the paramount objective, transcending all others. However, the establishment of a parallel government is unlikely to terminate hostilities; rather, it may exacerbate them, intensifying the contest between the two governments over sovereignty and influence. Each faction would seek to expand its dominion and encroach upon the other’s territory. Even if compelled by international or regional actors to negotiate a cessation of combat, such talks would likely devolve into a division or sharing of power and influence, leaving untouched the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts.

Second Conclusion: Should a parallel government materialize, civilian populations within the spheres of influence of either administration would remain the primary victims, reaping a harvest of death whether through the machinery of war, disease, famine, or sham trials and retaliatory purges.

Third Conclusion: Irrespective of the rhetoric espoused by advocates of the parallel government concerning a “New Sudan” and diversity management, the call for its formation entails ethnic mobilization and tribal rallying. This, in turn, will provoke counter-mobilizations, amplifying the tribal and ethnic dimensions of the war, compounding extant discourses of racism and hatred, and exacerbating the proliferation of brutal violence and identity- or affiliation-based killings. Such dynamics, once unleashed, are arduous to restrain, protracting the conflict or renewing it even after a nominal cessation, so long as the social fabric remains irreparably sundered.

Fourth Conclusion: The coexistence of dual governments will erode prospects for justice in Sudan, particularly regarding the egregious crimes and violations perpetrated during the war against both persons and civilian infrastructure—public and private alike—potentially enabling impunity for such atrocities.

Fifth Conclusion: Sudan’s geopolitical position inherently threatens to export its conflicts to neighboring states, especially those already grappling with fragile infrastructure, latent tensions, and tenuous security. The presence of two governments will intensify regional polarization, with some nations aligning with one administration and others with its rival, their eyes invariably fixed on resources of myriad kinds. This will aggravate extant regional tensions, risking their detonation, and may even extend such instability to global powers whose strategic interests—be they water, land, food security, minerals, trade routes, military bases, Red Sea security, or fears of burgeoning terrorist networks—intersect in Sudan and its environs.

Sixth Conclusion: It is improbable that the December 2018 revolution will find a foothold within the parallel government project, just as it is conspicuously absent from the Port Sudan administration. Indeed, a primary aim of the April 15, 2023, war was to stifle this revolution in its infancy. Yet, the youth who ignited that uprising persist—scattered across the domains of both the parallel and extant governments—resisting the war’s realities, seeking its end, mending the wounds of their aspirations, and weaving dreams of a democratic future Sudan. They will not permit their sacrifices to dissipate into oblivion.

These conclusions, among numerous others, intimate that the notion of a parallel government struggles to extricate itself from the clutches of the “vicious circle” afflicting Sudan.