No Peace without Clarity: The Five Unavoidable Questions Facing Sudan’s Path to Ending the War

No Peace without Clarity: The Five Unavoidable Questions Facing Sudan’s Path to Ending the War

“Peace requires more than negotiation—it demands a political order built on sovereignty, security reform, and national accountability.”

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

The guns will fall silent in Sudan one day, but peace will not be achieved by chance or through a political settlement crafted under foreign pressures, nor through yet another round of elite bargaining among political factions that conflate political deals with the national project. Rather, what Sudanese people need is to confront the pressing, difficult questions that are essential for stability before embarking on the project of state-building.

If Sudanese political community is serious about ending this catastrophic war and avoid a perpetual slide toward state failure, the Sudanese political community must confront five fundamental questions—with honesty, courage, and without outbidding or political evasion. Addressing these questions is not an academic luxury or an intellectual exercise. Rather, they form the foundation for building peace, restoring state stability, and preserving it. Continuing to avoid them is no longer a viable option. Any political process that attempts to sidestep them is not a peace process but a deliberate surrender to disintegration and Somalization.

These five questions can be summarized as follows:

1. What do we do with the Sudanese army?

2. What do we do with the current army leadership?

3. What do we do with the Rapid Support Forces militia?

4. How do we deal with the Islamic Movement in Sudan?

5. What do we do about the foreign and regional agendas fueling the war?

These questions cannot be postponed until a post-war dialogue because they are not secondary—rather, answering them is decisive, and avoiding them is what led Sudan to war.

1. What do we do with the Sudanese army?

Sudan will always have an army; this is indisputable. The very existence of the modern state depends on possessing a regular force that monopolizes the legitimate tools of violence within its borders. The definition of the state in political thought—from Max Weber to Clausewitz—stems from the monopoly on legitimate violence as one of the pillars of sovereignty. The army here is not merely a defensive apparatus but a structural pillar in the state’s framework and continuity.

In the absence of a disciplined and professional army, the state descends into fragmentation, crumbling into armed cantons, rival militias, and warlords dividing geography and influence. The army’s role, in its proper institutional form, is to protect the political system without usurping it, to safeguard the state without ruling it. Without a legitimate force imposing public order and protecting the social contract, societies revert to a primitive state of nature where violence becomes the language of power, might the measure of right, and rights mere temporary privileges granted and revoked by the law of the jungle. At that point, the law loses its spirit, and sovereignty becomes an illusion. Thus, the military institution is not just an organizational entity but an inseparable part of the state’s sovereign structure—an instrument through which the nation monopolizes its inherent right to defend itself and preserve its entity.

The real question is not whether Sudan should have a strong army—that is a given. But rather, what kind of army do we want, with what doctrine, leadership, economy, and accountability framework?

Throughout its history, the Sudanese army has been both a state institution and a political actor; intervening in public life, disrupting civilian political practice, executing coup after coup, and hiding behind patriotic rhetoric to justify control and despotism. However, this overlap between the state’s function and the function of power weakened the army itself before weakening the state. Political practice stripped it of the neutrality presumed in sovereign institutions, dragging it into power struggles and maneuvers, while its military nature rendered it incapable of effectively managing civilian affairs or dealing with the logic of the modern state based on civilian consensus, pluralism, and democracy.

Yet, the army was not inherently political; it was politicized over decades through authoritarian ambitions, weak civilian governance, ideological manipulation, regional sabotage, and inadequate professional oversight. Reforming the army today is not a project of revenge and should not be reduced to settling political scores; rather, it is a rescue operation with two goals: saving the state from disintegration and saving the military institution from institutional decay and collapse, by restoring its professionalism and anchoring its natural role as a sovereign pillar that protects the state, not as a tool of power or a party to political conflict.

Returning the army to its legitimate role requires a national framework for cooperation and a clear division of responsibilities that prevents overlap and the politicization of the military institution. The civilian authority’s role is limited to defining national security objectives, while the military institution is entrusted with planning and executing them. To achieve this, clear foundations must consensually be built now, not after the war ends, to avoid repeating a military transition that reproduces the past. These foundations include:

  • Comprehensive professional restructuring: Including updating training systems, basing recruitment and promotion on merit, and rejecting calls to structure the army on tribal or regional affiliations.
  • Civilian oversight that is nationally legitimate and agreed upon: This will not be achieved through slogans or external pressures but requires a convincing national consensus process with popular support, within a broader political transformation that includes crafting a permanent constitution clearly defining the army’s place in the state structure and its subordination to elected civilian authorities.
  • Regulating military economic activities: Defining the limits of permitted military investment within legal frameworks that ensure transparency and prevent conflicts of interest, subjecting military companies to state oversight and public auditing to ensure resources serve the national economy without building networks of influence.

These measures are not punitive but essential conditions for saving the state, reforming its structures, and restoring its sovereignty. They ensure the establishment of a modern army whose function is protection, not governance, paving the way for a genuine political transition toward a stable civilian democratic state.

2. What do we do with the current army leadership?

The current army leadership has remained a key part of the Sudanese political equation since 2019, and its role has become more controversial and polarizing after the October 2021 coup. But since the outbreak of war in April 2023, the army leadership has gained widespread popularity and grassroots support due to its role in confronting the massacres, mass sexual violence, looting, displacement, and ethnic cleansing committed by its rival: the Rapid Support Forces militia, which has caused suffering for millions of Sudanese. However, this war-time popularity cannot serve as a pretext for entrenching military rule. Rather, it places on this leadership the responsibility to manage an organized transition toward civilian governance, starting with national reconciliation and not ending until the establishment of civilian oversight authority over the state, including the armed forces, culminating in the installation of a democratically elected civilian government.

The role of the current army leadership in the transition is defined by a realistic and practical framework, including an organized and supervised transitional strategy to harness its influence and popularity in a clear political transition process. This step is crucial to avoid the collapse of institutions and the fragmentation of the state apparatus, which the army leadership currently consolidates. This temporary transitional arrangement from war to stability is an essential precautionary measure for the state, aimed at laying the foundations for long-term stability. This role is not a privilege but a responsibility that redefines leadership positions as sites of public service, not spoils or trophies.

3. What do we do with the Rapid Support Forces militia?

Here, the answer must be clear and unambiguous. The Rapid Support Forces are not a national institution—they are a militia monstrosity, a paramilitary Frankenstein created by Omar al-Bashir as a tool for his regime’s survival, outside the state’s structure and against its very logic, to serve as a rough arm for his protection, not the nation’s. Ending the institutional existence of this militia is a long-overdue national duty. Allowing it to grow into the monstrous war machine it is today, was a grave sin shared by all political forces to varying degrees: those who remained silent and appeased, those who funded and bargained, those who used it as leverage, and those who armed it and drew strength from it. Today, the whole nation now pays the ultimate price.

The RSF was not created to defend the country but to terrorize it. It was manufactured as a tool of terror to burn villages in Darfur and kill protesters in Khartoum, then transformed into a mercenary company fighting proxy wars, before being politically repackaged and internationally marketed as a partner in counter-terrorism and migration control. Yet, the truth has not changed: It has been and remains an armed looting syndicate dressed in military uniform—from gold smuggling, human trafficking, cross-border pillage, and organized corruption with an armed facade. After al-Bashir’s fall, it did not take long to find a new foreign patron.

The solution to Sudan’s crisis is not the naive proposal promoted through some political circles and foreign powers: that Sudan weaken its official army or accept a security system where multiple armed forces coexist through negotiated integration. History says the opposite: A state with more than one army ceases to be a state. The RSF’s parallel existence to the armed forces did not enhance Sudan’s stability but produced the current destructive war. National sovereignty and the state’s monopoly on force cannot be shared between a constitutional army and a private militia. One must remain, and the other must end.

The ongoing war has proven that the RSF is not a political project; it has no ideology beyond greed for profit, no national cause beyond the pursuit of power, and no loyalty except to its funders. It is a complete model of militia takeover of the state: a predatory economy, ethnic exploitation, and terrorism as a mechanism of rule. The existence of this militia is incompatible in the long term with any vision of a modern national state. It must be dismantled. Dismantling it is not just because of its criminality but because it is structurally incompatible with the natural structure of the state. No state can coexist with a private army on its soil.

But dismantling does not mean romantic slogans about military crushing, nor does it mean surrendering to letting warlords escape punishment. Rather, it means designing a serious strategy for disarmament and ending the war economy in a way that protects the state from a 1990s-style Somalization model. This requires a clear arrangement for priorities in dealing with the RSF:

  • Isolating war criminals and perpetrators deserving of accountability, while creating safe exit paths for those forced into fighting or recruitment.
  • Providing voluntary incentives for reintegration for non-politicized fighters, including tribal youth coerced or economically exploited.
  • Neutralizing regional patronage networks by imposing the principle of state sovereignty over its internal affairs and ending foreign interference in military and political structures.
  • Preventing the recycling of warlords through any political whitewashing or media rebranding.
  • Rehabilitating livelihood systems in the peripheries and rebuilding local security institutions to prevent the birth of new militias filling the post-RSF vacuum.

This dismantling must be organized and as peaceful as possible, without further drowning Sudanese in blood. A package of incentives for militia leaders and their foreign patrons may be a bitter pill, but it could be necessary to avoid an endless war. The political process for reintegrating fighters into civilian society is crucial to avoid perpetual guerrilla warfare. But no illusion, no propaganda, no public relations campaigns, and no opportunistic alliances can transform the RSF into a legitimate national force or a natural political actor. Its fate is sealed: dissolution, because a Sudan reclaiming its sovereignty cannot coexist with organized crime wearing an official uniform.

4. How do we deal with the Islamic Movement in Sudan?

The Islamic Movement ruled Sudan for thirty years, leaving a brutal record of corruption, despotism, systematic repression, wars, and deliberate national division. Political justice—not settling scores—requires a clear distinction: Not every Islamist is a war criminal; indeed, some of their youth actively contributed to the December Revolution and resisted the former regime. But many leaders of the previous regime committed crimes against the people, and some are wanted by the International Criminal Court, chief among them al-Bashir himself.

The Sudanese people delivered their verdict against this project in the December Revolution of 2018–2019. Millions chanted “Just fall!” and the dictatorship fell. But history teaches us that revolutions topple regimes without uprooting their deep structures. Revolutions overthrow rulers but do not eradicate their networks embedded in the state. Indeed, al-Bashir’s fall did not mean the defeat of political Islam; its networks remained planted in the state’s joints, within civil service institutions, security, economy, and media.

Nevertheless, political justice—not revenge—requires distinguishing levels of responsibility within this current. Some Islamists were involved in crimes and conspired against any democratic path. But others split from it, some participated in the revolution, and some today fight in defense of their country against the RSF militia. There is no room here for moral laziness: Generalization is an evasion of responsibility and submission to a foreign agenda seeking to justify its military intervention in Sudan.

It is also mistaken to view the Islamic Movement as a monolithic bloc. The National Congress Party lost its structural cohesion after the revolution, its ranks torn by personal conflicts, generational differences, and contradictions between the hardline ideological guard and pragmatists seeking survival. What appears as cohesion today among Islamists is not political conviction but forced solidarity driven by fear—fear of accountability, exclusion, and criminal prosecution. It is trench unity, not project unity. The existence of the Popular Congress Party faction led by Ali al-Haj, allied or aligned with Taqaddum which calls for excluding Islamists from the scene, is evidence of this.

Therefore, the only practical approach lies in crafting a balanced political equation based on conditional transitional inclusion alongside uncompromising accountability, which can take the following form:

  • Those who committed crimes must be held accountable—no negotiation on justice.
  • Those who accept democratic rules can be granted a political path—under strict guarantees.
  • Those working to restore dictatorship must be defeated politically—through popular will and institutions.

This is not a theoretical vision. Transitional justice experiences from South Africa to Latin America and Eastern Europe indicate that societies do not heal through vengeance but by organizing political participation based on justice and accountability. The question is not: How do we eradicate Islamists from political life? But: How do we prevent any force—Islamist or otherwise—from hijacking the state again?

Transitional inclusion must balance accountability and political pluralism. A pluralistic democracy cannot be built by excluding an entire social current, but stability also cannot be built by reproducing impunity. Democracy is competition governed by rules and the constitution. The balance lies in conditional inclusion with non-negotiable accountability: Allowing those committed to democratic norms to participate, while preventing policies of revenge or ideological hegemony.

Moreover, supporting moderate and rational elements within the Islamist current and allowing them opportunities for participation isolates extremist factions and contributes to stability during the transitional period, reducing the risk of ideological extremism. But their participation must be conditioned on accepting accountability for past violations, legally prosecuting criminals, actively contributing to dismantling empowerment networks within state institutions, and strictly adhering to democratic standards and practices while rejecting political violence. In return, the National Congress Party—which was legally dissolved—cannot claim representation; this is a constraint from justice that Islamists must bear for their bitter ruling legacy.

5. What do we do about the foreign and regional agendas fueling the war?

The outbreak of war in April 2023 revealed that Sudan’s sovereignty has been fractured for long time, treated as a negotiable commodity rather than a governing principle. Foreign actors exploited institutional voids in state sovereignty to advance their strategic interests, turning Sudan into a theater for proxy conflicts, resource extraction, and political influence harvesting. This sovereignty fracture entrenched cycles of dependency and weakness. Foreign agendas now shape internal power dynamics, providing protection or patronage to militias, politicians, and even native and tribal leaderships, supporting factions willing to trade national interests for short-term gains. Sudanese elites, in turn, seek internal gains through external alliances, reinforcing a self-perpetuating system where advancement in power positions comes not from competence or legitimacy but from foreign patronage. The result is a fractured political scene governed by negotiation or settlement attempts shaped by external calculations, agendas, or even goals.

The true path to peace requires reaffirming national constants: principles and boundaries that define Sudan’s sovereignty, reclaiming its national political agency, and the authority of its institutions derived from within. Formulating a national doctrine for dealing with foreign relations has become essential, and it must entrench the following commitments:

  • Rejection of any foreign patronage for militias or political institutions: All security and political actors must derive their legitimacy from internal existence or constitutional mandate, not external patronage.
  • Transparency and accountability in foreign economic arrangements: Foreign partnerships cannot bypass public oversight or national interest. Strategic resources and economic deals must strengthen the state’s capacity, not weaken it.
  • Civilian authority over security and military agreements: No security agreements—alliances, bases, or military aid—conducted without elected civilian institutions or bypassing them.
  • Sovereign neutrality in strategic positioning: The compass for dealing with foreign powers is national interest, not passive surrender or ideological calculations.
  • Principled mutual partnerships: Sudan’s international relations must be based on mutual respect, enforceable commitments, and strategic exchange, not transactional dependency.

Reclaiming Sudanese agency requires not only commitment to these principles but developing internal institutions capable of protecting them and prepared for negotiation, implementation, and independent decision-making based on them. Peace without sovereignty is not peace but a temporary illusion. Without a clear, implementable national doctrine that restores the state’s ability to impose its rules and shape its choices according to its interests, any settlement will turn into a fragile truce open to foreign manipulation and regional blackmail. Only prioritizing arrangements based on a national project—reclaiming national agency and fortifying sovereign decision-making through capable state institutions, a transparent political process, and disciplined execution—can break the cycle of subjugation and open the path to sustainable peace crafted by Sudanese for themselves, not dictated to them. Fractured sovereignty may have created Sudan’s troubled past, but rebuilding a cohesive and legitimate state authority is its only way to the future.

Conclusion: The Choice Before Us

Sudan does not suffer from a negotiation crisis—but a vision crisis. Many political actors rush to seats at negotiation tables without first agreeing on the fundamental questions these tables need to answer to save the country from disintegration. But no one will secure power in a collapsed state. There will be no authority to exercise, no institutions to manage, no sovereignty to claim—only the ruins of a state devoured by militias, war economies, and foreign agendas. Peace is not made through shortcuts. The paths of state-building—political settlement, security sector reform, and economic governance—must be managed in a logical, gradual sequence so they do not undermine each other. The elites clamoring for negotiation seats must realize a simple and harsh truth: No one builds sustainable power atop the rubble of a disintegrating state. Legitimacy is not seized through positions but earned through a political project’s ability to confront national collapse via a deliberate sequence linking reform, justice, and sovereignty, making each step reinforce the others rather than deepen existing fractures.

Answering these five questions is not a political luxury or a choice that can be postponed; it is a matter of survival. A ceasefire alone will not end the war, humanitarian aid alone will not rebuild the state, and negotiations that ignore these questions will only breed failure once more. Sudan’s political elites must realize the simple and harsh truth: Power cannot be seized in a collapsing state, for power derives its existence from legitimacy, and legitimacy is built only on systemic stability and state capacity. What Sudan needs today is not a new deal among elites but a national re-founding process. A conscious project to rebuild the political system from its roots, based on confronting the inevitable questions rather than fleeing them. This is not a battle for seats but a battle to save a nation and shape its future.

The political process in Sudan must be built on a strict sequence that does not allow skipping stages or mixing agendas, for chaos is not fate but a direct result of methodological absence. The path to the state begins with arranging its necessities, not the actors’ positions within it. Therefore, the national path out of war must follow a clear equation:

First, halting active fighting, followed by containing and dismantling militia forces and demilitarizing the public sphere, then proceeding to rebuild a unified professional national army and re-founding the state on civilian foundations, organizing political pluralism with fair rules that ensure reclaiming national sovereignty and building a productive economy.

But this gradation is not achieved through slogans or declarations of principles alone; rather, through structuring the negotiation process itself. A large part of the failure of previous paths resulted from mixing files and cycling deals between guns and political ambitions. Therefore, three independent negotiation processes must be separated in their subjects, interconnected in their outcomes:

1. Military-to-Military Negotiation

A permanent ceasefire and arrangements to end fighting is a purely military file, managed exclusively between the warring military actors, without politicization or trade-offs. Without attempting to exploit it politically for any party in the other paths, and its goal is clear: ending combat, dismantling the militia, and securing the unity and safety of the national territory. This file should not be hijacked to impose forced political settlements or recycle militia influence in the form of partnerships or integration without dismantling, to guarantee influence or future political gains for any side.

2. Civilian Political Negotiation

Sudan’s governance future must be shaped by national civilian political forces through a political process independent of the pressure of arms. This path determines the state’s form, governance system, transition rules, constitution, institutional reform, and transitional justice. It is entirely outside the military’s purview and their alliances; the military are not a political party and have no right to negotiate the form of governance. Similarly, attempts to insert the militia through new facades into this path and benefit from its military presence to achieve political gains directly contribute to prolonging the war.

3. Negotiation with Foreign Patrons

The war cannot end while the country’s doors remain wide open to regional agendas. Therefore, a special path for dealing with states involved in fueling the war—whether through financial support, armament, or proxies. This path must be based on national sovereignty constants:

  • Preventing Sudan from becoming an arena for influence struggles or a corridor for looting.
  • Ending war economy networks and cross-border smuggling.
  • Regulating foreign relations based on mutual interests, not dependency.

Dividing these three paths is not an organizational luxury but a condition to prevent repeating failed experiences: No political deal under the gun’s barrel, no rewards for militias, and no legitimization of foreign intervention. When these paths integrate, discussion becomes possible about a political settlement to restore stability—not one that reproduces war but establishes peace built on sovereignty and order, not fragile deals.

Sudan does not lack courage on battlefields but in the political arena. The guns will fall silent one day. Whether Sudan will stand on its feet again—or vanish into the map of failed states—depends on whether its political leaders confront these five questions now, with honesty, clarity, and national political will. For peace is not merely the absence of war. Peace is the existence of a state capable of defending its people, governing with legitimacy, and reclaiming its people’s sovereignty over its destiny.