Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North: The Dilemma of Negotiating Security Arrangements

Elwathig Kameir

Kameir@yahoo.com

Cairo August 13, 2025
 

The Achilles’ Heel of Peace and Democratic Transition

The thesis of my previous article posited was that security arrangements are the cornerstone and the litmus test of the peace equation—serving as the Achilles’ heel of the democratic transition. Resolving the issue of comprehensive security arrangements is the key to achieving security and stability across the country, and to facilitating and ensuring the safe return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes. Past experiences and subsequent political developments have confirmed the validity of this thesis.

Against the backdrop of recent disputes over entitlements of the power-sharing positions among the armed movements signatory the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan which have cast a shadow over the military’s alliance between the army and the Joint Forces of the armed movements. The article concluded that there is an urgent and pressing need to expedite the implementation of security arrangements, as stipulated in the agreement’s provisions. It is critically important to activate these arrangements, which pave the way for strengthening a unified national army, given that agreement over their procedures has already been agreed upon.

In this article, I will address the stance of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, regarding the issue of security arrangements. Specifically, I will examine how the refusal or obstruction of negotiations on this matte hinders the process of building a unified national army, but also impedes any serious attempt to achieve sustainable peace. Despite the scarcity of available information, I will also attempt to shed light on the extent to which the SPLM-N’s alignment with the “Ta’asis” alliance influences, or does not influence, its position on security arrangements.

SPLM-N’s Position on Security Arrangements

Throughout the transitional government’s negotiations with SPLM-N (led by Commander al-Hilu) since October 2019, the government delegation consistently sought to prioritize the issue of security arrangements leading to a ceasefire at the top of the agenda. However, the SPLM-N delegation rejected this approach and insisted that the security arrangements clause not be included in the agenda. The movement set two preconditions for engaging in negotiations with the government: first, the primary objective of the negotiations must be to reach a comprehensive Declaration of Principles to govern the negotiation process; second, the sequencing of negotiations should begin with political issues related to the root causes of the Sudanese crisis (particularly the relationship between religion and state and the right to self-determination), followed by humanitarian issues, and concluding with security arrangements and a comprehensive ceasefire.

Moreover, even if a Declaration of Principles were agreed upon, the SPLM-N would not relinquish its insistence on maintaining an “independent” People’s Army (SPLA) existence during the transitional period. Ironically, this stance was enshrined in the “Declaration of Principles Agreement” signed between the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and the SPLM-N leader on March 29, 2021. The agreement stipulated that “the process of merging and unifying forces must be gradual and completed by the end of the transitional period, after resolving the issue of the relationship between religion and state in the constitution.”

It is perhaps necessary to highlight some background information to clarify the motives behind the SPLM-N’s resolute commitment to maintaining the People’s Army during the transitional period until it is assured of the implementation of any peace agreement it signs. This will provide a more comprehensive understanding of this stance.

Historical Roots of SPLM-N’s Stance on Security Arrangements

First: In my view, far from being an expression of hostility or intransigence, the SPLM-N’s position on security arrangements has historical roots in the absorption of the Anya-Nya forces into the Sudanese army under the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. This process later became the primary cause of the renewed outbreak of war in 1983. John Garang, the late SPLM leader, believed that integrating the Anya-Nya forces into the Sudanese army before ensuring the implementation of the agreement was a grave mistake that should not be repeated with the People’s Army. In his view, this absorption weakened the position of southern politicians, making them vulnerable to President Nimeiri, who exploited the opportunity to unravel the agreement he had crafted. Consequently, the SPLM did not engage in any subsequent negotiations on security arrangements until the Machakos Protocol (2002) was signed, which served as a set of principles governing the negotiation process. Ironically, the security arrangements protocol was the first to be signed after the Machakos Protocol (September 25, 2003) among the six protocols of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Second: It is worth noting that SPLM-N has endured a similarly bitter experience in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), which compels it to exercise caution before entering into any security arrangements this time. The CPA’s security protocol failed—both in design and implementation—to address the status of SPLA forces in these regions. According to the protocol’s terms, the SPLA was defined as a unified entity belonging to South Sudan, without specifying the identity or origin of its fighters—whether they hailed from South Kordofan or Blue Nile. The agreement was entirely silent on the fate of thousands of fighters from these regions outside the joint integrated units stationed with their parent units in the People’s Army in South Sudan. e. The CPA’s security arrangements protocol failed, both in design and implementation, to address the status of the People’s Army in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. According to the protocol’s terms, the People’s Army was treated as an indivisible entity affiliated with South Sudan, without specifying the identity or origin of its fighters—whether they hailed from either of the Two Areas. The agreement was entirely silent on the fate of thousands of fighters from these regions outside the joint integrated units stationed with their parent units in the People’s Army in South Sudan. In light of the failure to meet the agreement’s timelines and political obligations for the Two Areas, the Salvation Government threatened to forcibly disarm the People’s Army if its forces were not demobilized or redeployed to the south, sparking renewed conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in June and September 2011, respectively.

Third: The issue of the People’s Army was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back for the SPLM-N. It was one of two strategic contentious issues, alongside self-determination, and a primary reason for the resignation of the movement’s then-deputy leader, Lieutenant General Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, in March 2017, which led to the announced split within the movement’s leadership in October of that year. Al-Hilu’s resignation letter contained unmistakable references accusing the dismissed SPLM-N Secretary-General, Yasir Arman, and the head of its negotiating delegation, of seeking a compromise with the ruling regime that included concessions on security arrangements. In Al-Hilu’s view, this meant “disarming the People’s Army through its absorption into the National Congress Party’s army, thereby ending its role as a guarantor of any agreement or as a tool of pressure to achieve democratic transformation and just peace.”

Fourth: Ironically, the dispute over these two strategic issues—the fate of the SPLA and the right to self-determination—did not emerge from accumulated disagreements within the movement’s tripartite leadership. In fact, it dates back 14 years to the signing of the Agar–Nafi Agreement on June 28, 2011. According to Al-Hilu’s resignation letter, “Just 22 days after the outbreak of the second war on 6/6/2011, the Secretary-General and Chairman of the movement presented me with a draft framework agreement—known as the Agar-Nafi–Agreement—which I opposed due to the clauses concerning security arrangements, as they aimed to absorb the SPLA into the National Congress Party’s army.” This also applies to the right to self-determination, which was absent from the agreement that the then-President tore up before its ink had even dried.

Does the SPLM-N’s Involvement in the “Ta’asis” Alliance Affect Its Position on Security Arrangements?

The SPLM-N, led by commander Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, signed the “Foundational Charter for Unity and Peace Government” and the “Transitional Constitution for the Republic of Sudan 2025” alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, armed movements that were signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, and other political and societal forces, on February 23 and March 4, respectively, in Nairobi, Kenya.  In addition to these documents, the Sudan Foundational Alliance (Ta’asis) announced on July 2, 2025, the composition of its 31-member leadership Council and 15-member Presidential Council, along with the nomination of a Prime Minister. However, the executive “authority” and other institutions outlined in the transitional constitution remain in the process of formation.

Given this new political stance of the SPLM-N, a fundamental question arises: What is the impact of the movement’s alignment with the RSF militia in the “Ta’asis” alliance on its steadfast position regarding security arrangements? In my view, it is still too early to answer this question, as the governance structures and institutions of this alliance, according to the transitional constitution, are still being formed. Moreover, the state institutions and executive “authority” have not yet been fully established or convened to formulate policies and political positions, particularly regarding negotiations. In the absence of information, providing a comprehensive answer to this question and its related sub-questions is challenging, leaving room only for speculative scenarios based on assumptions. In the absence of concrete information, it is difficult to provide a definitive answer to this question and its related sub-questions. At best, one can attempt to sketch out scenarios based on available assumptions and hypotheses.

Before sitting at the negotiating table, it is logical that the negotiating parties and the agenda must first be determined. Prior to the announcement of the “Ta’asis” alliance and the initial steps toward forming its authority and state, the call for negotiations had identified the army and the RSF as the primary parties, based on the Jeddah Declaration (May 2023). This declaration limited the negotiation agenda to “protecting civilians, reaching a short-term ceasefire to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery and the restoration of essential services, and scheduling subsequent broader discussions to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities.” Notably, the declaration’s second clause stipulated that commitment to it would not be linked to engagement in any political process. However, since that time, much has changed in the military, political, and societal landscape of the war. All regional and international efforts to halt and end the war in Sudan have failed to bring the military and political adversaries to the negotiating table or engage in dialogue. Moreover, these efforts have not succeeded in agreeing on a strong mediation platform or even a framework to impose on the warring parties, as even the “Quad” is not considered a mediation platform. Will the Jeddah platform remain the reference for negotiations?

If negotiations become a reality and are accepted by all relevant parties, what will be the nature of the negotiations in terms of the participating parties and the agenda? In my view, it is likely that the RSF and its military and political allies will demand negotiations with the government as a “state-founding authority” or with the “Ta’asis” political alliance. Conversely, I believe the government in Port Sudan will only agree to negotiate with the RSF and SPLM-N, and following two separate tracks. The government and RSF had already engaged in negotiations in Jeddah (May–December 2023), while SPLM-N had been negotiating with the transitional government since late 2019, without reaching a Declaration of Principles to govern the process.

As for the armed movements signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement (now part of the “Ta’asis” alliance), I doubt the government will renegotiate with them, especially since the Sudan Liberation Forces Gathering and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council have representatives in the Sovereignty Council. Another point of interest is that the SPLM-N continued negotiations with the de facto government before joining the “Ta’asis” alliance. Will it maintain this approach, or will it insist on negotiating as part of the “Ta’asis” alliance and its military forces? 

The approach followed by post-independence governments to achieve peace has been to negotiate with armed “rebels,” particularly under the Salvation Government, which distinguished between “political dialogue” with the National Congress Party and political forces and “military negotiations” with the government and armed movements. The Salvation Government never accepted negotiations with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), engaging only with the SPLM and the People’s Army, disregarding the armed partisan factions within the alliance’s joint military forces. Moreover, the idea of establishing a parallel “authority” or founding a new state never occurred to the opposition’s military and political leadership. Additionally, in the history of Sudanese political negotiations, the central government has never entered a negotiation platform involving multiple armed factions, except perhaps the Juba platform for Sudan’s peace.

The Founding Authority’s Constitution and the Security Arrangements Dilemma

On the other hand, the transitional constitution of the “Ta’asis authority” emphasized that the transitional “peace government” would take the necessary steps to establish a unified, professional, and national army with a new military doctrine. It also stipulated that the RSF, the SPLM-N’s People’s Army, and the armed movements signatory to the Sudan Foundational Charter would form the nucleus of this new national army, while acknowledging the dissolution of militias affiliated with the National Congress Party, the Islamic Movement, and other militias. 

However, contrary to defining the general objectives for forming this unified national army, the Foundational Charter did not address the mechanisms or processes for its formation, nor did it directly or indirectly tackle the significant challenge of internal security arrangements among the RSF and the armed movements within the alliance—the fundamental mechanism for forming this army. If the process of forming a unified army from the alliance’s armed factions remains unclear, it is difficult to predict the nature and manner of engaging in security arrangements with the government and armed forces in the context of negotiations whose occurrence remains uncertain.

Ironically, while the “Ta’asis authority” constitution emphasizes ending the phenomenon of multiple armies and establishing a single national army, there appears to be a contradiction between the constitution and the alliance’s charter regarding this goal, raising questions. Indeed, one of the charter’s general principles stipulates “recognition of the right of the armed movements signatory to this charter to continue armed struggle as a legitimate means of resistance and struggle for change and building the new Sudan” (“Foundational Charter for Unity and Peace Government: Toward a Nation for All,” Sudanese News, February 23, 2025). This contradiction raises a question: Against whom will this armed struggle be directed? Against the new national army, of which it is theoretically a part? How can this army be unified if it is fighting itself? Or does the Foundational Charter anticipate a long-term war (or wars)?

My intuition suggests that unless the military and political balance of power shifts dramatically and the time for negotiations arrives, the most likely scenario is that the government and armed forces will refuse to negotiate with the “Ta’asis” alliance or authority to avoid upsetting the balance at the negotiating table. Instead, I believe the government will adopt a “piecemeal” approach, negotiating with each armed faction separately. The reference for negotiations with the RSF is the Jeddah platform and its declaration of principles, focusing solely on a military agenda without political negotiations. Negotiations with the SPLM-N already have their own track based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and unresolved issues, ongoing since the war’s outbreak in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in June and September 2011, respectively, and during the transitional period until the “partnership dissolution” coup on October 25, 2021. The lack of clear information and positions from Commander Abdel Wahid Nur, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, makes it difficult to predict the nature and form of his negotiations with the government. As for the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement—such as the Sudan Liberation Forces Gathering (Tahir Hajar), the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council (Hadi Idris), and the Justice and Equality Movement (Suleiman Sandal)—I am unsure of the negotiation path they will choose.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, assuming other factors remain constant, the SPLM-N, led by Commander Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, will likely maintain its stance on negotiating and engaging in security arrangements. Any change in its long-standing principled position on security arrangements remains improbable, and the movement will likely adhere to it steadfastly. This makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to reach a sustainable peace agreement between the SPLM-N and the government in the foreseeable future. However, this stance does not, by any means, imply severing communication or dialogue with the SPLM-N under Al-Hilu’s leadership. The movement has a historical legacy and deep-rooted relationships with all political and societal forces in the country. The late SPLM leader, John Garang, recognized from the movement’s inception that it could not single-handedly accomplish the task of building a unified, viable Sudan, thereby averting the perils of fragmentation and disintegration. Thus, from the outset, he was keen to forge ties with various political and societal entities in the north (particularly “traditional forces”) and extend a hand to them as an effective means of achieving the primary goal of establishing national unity on new foundations and building a state of citizenship.

John Garang played a pivotal role in building alliances with these forces, from Koka Dam in 1986 to the National Democratic Alliance after the Islamist coup, and the Asmara Conference for Fundamental Issues in 1995. Without this approach of engaging with diverse political and societal forces and uniting them to agree on the nation’s foundational issues, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its political and economic gains for South Sudan would not have been achieved. Crucially, Garang never entertained the idea of forming a parallel authority or founding a new secular state, nor did the SPLM, with its allies, draft a constitution to establish such a state. Instead, he resisted demands from some SPLM and People’s Army leaders to seize Juba when their forces besieged the city for an extended period, to avoid bearing the responsibility of disrupting state institutions and their ability to deliver services—a significant burden he did not wish to impose on the movement, as it would hinder the liberation process and transformation.

Similarly, the SPLM-N under Abdelaziz Al-Hilu has not ceased communication or signing memoranda of understanding and declarations of principles with various political forces of differing ideological orientations, including a political agreement with the resigned prime minister in September 2020 and a declaration of principles with the head of the Sovereignty Council in March 2021. Against this backdrop, I addressed an open letter to Commander Abdelaziz Al-Hilu on March 20, 2023, less than a month before the war’s outbreak. In the letter, I argued that his signing of these memoranda and joint statements with ideologically diverse political forces was a significant entry point not only for expanding the SPLM’s political understandings but also for becoming a key political actor in a process leading to a foundational constitutional dialogue, which the late SPLM leader had advocated for since the early 1980s. 

 I urged Commander Abdelaziz to revive the movement’s historical role, as charted by John Garang, and to invite the political forces that signed agreements with him, along with other willing forces, to hold a “constitutional exercise” hosted in Kauda. (Al-Wathig Kameir, “Open Letter to Commander Abdelaziz Al-Hilu: Why Not Call for a Constitutional Exercise?” Sudanile, March 20, 2023).

In a detailed published response to my open letter, Commander Abdelaziz Al-Hilu reaffirmed the SPLM’s understandings with most Sudanese political forces on issues of establishing a modern, secular, and democratic Sudanese state. He stated that the movement “will continue its efforts with these forces to build a nation that accommodates all through a national project and a new social contract, but with calculated steps and effective mechanisms, not including a constitutional conference.”

Two years after this letter, it appears that Commander Abdelaziz has concluded that his alliance with the RSF is the calculated step, and the SPLM’s participation in the parallel “Ta’asis authority” is the effective mechanism to impose a theoretical secular state without the need for a constitutional dialogue outside its framework. Is this a viable, sound, and safe option for building a Sudanese state of citizenship, the essence of the “New Sudan” vision? (Abdelaziz Adam Al-Hilu, “Response to Dr. Al-Wathig Kameir’s Open Letter,” Sudanile, April 1, 2023).

It is true that the SPLM was the initiator and primary driver of transforming the “New Sudan” vision into reality at a specific historical moment. However, this vision, at its core, is a conceptual framework, not a doctrine or ideology exclusive to the SPLM. The task of building a Sudanese state based on citizenship and a unified, viable Sudan is a national project that the SPLM does not own or monopolize alone.

I conclude with a quote often repeated by the late leader John Garang: “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is the one that put forward the vision of the New Sudan. However, just as the Old Sudan is undergoing radical changes in its transition toward the New Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement itself must undergo development and fundamental transformations (north and south).” Indeed, the theory is green, but reality spans a wide spectrum of colors.