The Civilian Alliance (Taqadum), led by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, held its first publicly announced meeting with the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti), at the dawn of the new year, which coincided with Sudan’s 68th anniversary of independence. This meeting came after more than eight months of war, which the militia launched against Sudanese army forces in April 2023 as part of their competition for exclusive control after joining forces in the October 25, 2021, coup to capture it.

The meeting concluded on the second day, resulting in announcing the signing of an agreement between Hamdok, representing the “Taqadum” forces, and Hemedti, representing his militias, on January 2, 2024.

On the first day of the meeting, over twenty of the self-identified civilian leaders queued in a line, anticipating the arrival of Hemedti. Accompanied by two advisors, Hemedti proceeded to take his seat at the forefront of the gathering. The members of the Taqadum delegation promptly approached the militia leader, extending their arms for a handshake, conveying their greetings, and loudly expressing their congratulations on his well-being. The miserable spectacle of Taqadum leaders eagerly racing to welcome Hemedti, the same man who commands a militia that continue to kill, displace, rape, and loot their people, with friendly grins was a ceremonial display of loyalty and subservience to Hemedti, rather than anything else.

Allegiance to the victorious conqueror. This was the rallying cry of the “Taqadum” delegation that met with Hemedti, spearheaded by Hamdok. In this context, it wasn’t a surprise that Hamdok’s delegation included clear supporters of the militia. One of the delegates got up and took a picture of Hemedti and the militia advisors from inside the meeting. She then posted the picture on social media right away with the caption, “The prince himself, may God protect and sanctify him.”

The former member of the Sovereignty Council, Muhammad Hassan Al-Taayshi who is largely responsible for the narrative of fighting the state of 1956 (the year that witnessed Sudan’s independence) which is a narrative used to justify the militia’s violations and crimes was as well part of the delegation. In July 2023, after the outbreak of war, the militia held a conference in Togo to mobilize political support, and Al-Taayshi presented a paper to the militia outlining this narrative.

The delegation also included Taha Othman Ishaq, a long-time civil forces liaison with the militia, who increasingly became the militia’s representative in the corridors of the Freedom and Change Forces and later “Taqadum”, without any sort of legitimacy of representation in the Civilian Forces.

Taha’s involvement also brings up the issue of representation within the “Taqadum” front, which aims to represent a wide spectrum of civilians. He holds this position as a representative of the Sudanese Professionals Association. Taha was indeed part of the formation of the Professionals Association during the revolution. After the revolution’s success, the association conducted internal elections in May 2020 to refresh its leadership positions. This was a vote that Taha and the faction he represents lost, so they simply announced a split of the association and the creation of a parallel one. The Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change declined to endorse the election results and refused to represent the elected leadership with the alliance structures. The Forces of Freedom and Change justified their actions by emphasizing maintaining a balanced power dynamic within the alliance, that self-designated itself as a political incubator for the government at the time. However, it was clear that their true motivation was to prevent the more left-leaning voices, who had won the elections, from gaining influence and consolidating their position within the coalition. Forces of Freedom and Change frozen the factions of the association for some time, before authorizing the faction that lost the election back its structures.

Similarly, “Taqadum” Front declared that their delegation includes representatives from the Resistance Committees. The delegation did include Osman Sir Al-Khatim, who once served as a member of the South Khartoum Resistance Committee. However, since 2022, the Kalakla and South Khartoum Resistance Committees have repeatedly declared the suspension of his participation and his removal from the committee’s representation. This was most recently documented in the press circular released by the Coordination of the Kalakla and South Khartoum Resistance Committees on January 1, 2024, following Othman’s participation in the Taqadum delegation, where he claimed to represent the committees. The Coordination Committee explicitly declared that it is not affiliated with Taqadum and that it did not appoint Othman or any other individual to represent it in Taqaddam or its preliminary sessions. It further stated that Othman is not affiliated with any of the grassroots committees describing his actions of impersonating the Kalakla and South Khartoum Resistance Committees as a deliberate attempt to manipulate and misrepresent the views and political stance of the coordination. Simply, the Taqadum alliance, purporting to advocate for civilians and call for democracy, remained conspicuously silent in response to this unambiguous and candid indictment.
 
Establishing a civilian front through the division of the civilian constituent entities is widely utilized by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). This strategy of (Divide and Rule) has long been employed by by the FFC in its attempt to monopolize the civilian voice in Sudan, especially when it comes to international foreign audience and the diplomatic circles who may not be fully aware of the intricacies of our political system or who may turn a blind eye to these tactics in support of their allies or agents within the FFC. Before that, the “Forces of Freedom and Change” utilized a comparable approach with the Democratic Unionist Party, involving Ibrahim Al-Mirghani to independently sign the framework agreement on behalf of the party and against the directions of its institutions. Ibrahim persisted in asserting his representation of the party, and FFC maintained their recognition of him as such, despite the party’s institutions repeatedly declaring the suspension of his membership. The most recent announcement came after his meeting with the militia leader on the heels of his agreement with Taqadum.


In any case, Taqadum and Hemedti met and reached an agreement, stating its goal was to end the fight. There were three parts to the agreement. We can all agree on the names of the first set of humanitarian concerns and promises, but will we ever actually see them implemented?

In the agreement, the RSF militia committed to releasing 451 prisoners of war and detainees and handing them over to the Red Cross. The agreement considered this a gesture of goodwill, but it did not clarify the identity of these detainees. The matter is clear in the definition of prisoners of war, but everyone is silent about the definition of these detainees. So why does the militia detain citizens and detain them in the worst conditions in detention centers estimated by human rights organizations to be 44 centers in Khartoum alone, and on what basis?! Moving on… The agreement recognized their release, and there is no consolation for the slogans of the rule of law, equality in rights and duties, or the protection of public freedoms.

The agreement went on to declare the militia’s commitment to “open safe corridors for the arrival of humanitarian aid and provide the necessary guarantees to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations and protect relief workers,” as well as “create an atmosphere conducive to the return of citizens to their homes in the areas affected by the war (Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Al-Gezira),” and “the formation of the National Committee for the Protection of Civilians.” This can only be described as gratuitous talk as part of the FFC efforts in creating the illusive alternative reality, because the agreement ignores to recognize that the militia and its operations are the primary reason for the cessation of humanitarian relief efforts. Not long ago, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid declared that all humanitarian relief operations in Gezira State have been halted due to the attack by the Rapid Support Forces on Wad Madani. Meanwhile, UNICEF is making ongoing efforts to relocate orphan children from the Maygoma shelter who were initially moved to Wad Madani after the militia invaded Khartoum, only to be relocated once again now following the RSF’s assault on Madani. Similarly, just four days before Hamdok signed his agreement with the RSF militia leader, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) announced that Rapid Support Forces had broken into its warehouse and office in Wad Medani and looted supplies and stocks sufficient to feed nearly 1.5 million severely food insecure people for a month. 2,500 metric tons of life-saving food, including pulses, sorghum, vegetable oil, and nutrition supplements, were looted. The tailored nutritional foods were designed to prevent and assist malnutrition treatment for over 20,000 children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and other vulnerable people through WFP-supported health clinics. As a result, the World Food Program announced a halt to its operations in the region.

Regarding the repatriation of civilians to their residences, both the militia and “Taqadum” have failed to provide any information regarding the specific actions they will undertake to vacate the homes that are still occupied by militia members, despite being looted multiple times.

The agreement subsequently addressed the establishment of a trustworthy committee tasked with investigating who started the war, while disregarding the findings of the Sudan Conflict Observatory. It is worth noting that the observatory was formed, supported and endorsed by the Jeddah platform, which the agreement, Taqaddam, and the militia consistently applaud. Sudan Conflict Observatory operates under the auspices of Yale University. The US State Department, through its Conflict and Stabilization Operations Department, announced on June 9 that it had adopted and provided funding for this Observatory.  The spokesperson of the US State Department announced that the Observatory will employ satellite imagery and scrutinize data to analyze, monitor, and record violations and transgressions committed by the two parties in accordance with their obligations under the Jeddah Agreement for the Protection of Civilians which was signed by both parties on May 11, 2023. The Observatory’s report, released on July 14, 2023, included photographs, data analysis, and collected information to unequivocally assert that the war in Sudan, initiated on April 15, 2023, was instigated by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his Rapid Support Forces with the aim of seizing power. This is in addition to the firsthand experiences of the Sudanese people witnessing the brutal actions of the militia in their savage conflict against the Sudanese population. The report also highlights the alarming resemblance between the current tactics employed by the rapid support forces and those previously used by the Janjaweed during the Darfur war between 2003 and 2004. What other form of credibility and investigation does Taqadum seek to establish in its arrangement with the militia? Are they requesting that the RSF name be absolved of the consequences of its acts in order to establish credibility?

The “Taqadum” coalition’s continued promotion of the alternative reality narrative that the militia is attempting to create and defend not only places Taqadum in the realm of collusion with the militia in its war, but the second part of the Addis Ababa Agreement reveals their implicit political alliance. This part addresses explicit political issues such as the structure of the state, plans for restructuring and reforming the security sector, and even the reconstruction of civil service agencies. These are civil political concerns that should be discussed first and foremost among civilian politicians, who are not collectively represented by the “Taqadum” coalition in any way. If Taqadum’s reasoning and effort to meet with the militia leader are acknowledged as part of their effort to end the war, what do these issues have to do with ending the war? The evidence suggests that Taqadum is attempting to impose its vision on earlier political concerns under the guise of ending the war. However, this undermines the fundamental demand and slogan of the revolution, which is to remove the military forces from the realm of politics. Furthermore, it undermines its stated purpose of bringing the two parties closer together in the context of ending the war, because it decides on political matters ahead of time, declares its agreement on them with one side, and strives to force them on the other.
The objective of the meeting between the two generals is to push them to make the necessary humanitarian obligations and pledges, as well as to impose a ceasefire that must be monitored by neutral parties capable of enforcing the pledges made by the two military parties. Involving the two parties in political and state administration affairs, on the other hand, cannot be regarded reasonable or acceptable for settling Sudan’s war.

What occurred in Addis Abeba was only a foreshadowing of a humiliating alliance between Taqadum and the Rapid Support Forces militia. The adoption of a political vision implies a bilateral alliance of civilian and military forces, which legitimizes the armed forces’ ongoing engagement in political action. What’s more concerning is that the agreement signed in Addis Abeba at the beginning of the year between Hamdok and Hemedti may stymie and complicate the “IGAD” efforts to hold a direct meeting between Burhan and Hemedti. “Taqadum” had foretold the pledge of allegiance meeting with a statement in which it attempted to blame the army for disrupting the IGAD meeting of the two generals, despite the fact that the Djiboutian Foreign Ministry had explicitly stated that the meeting had been postponed due to technical circumstances related to the “RSF” commander.

However, it is now obvious that the technical circumstances described by the militia leader were tied to the beginning of his political activity with this encounter with Taqadum. The preparatory meetings of “Taqadum” that preceded the meeting at the beginning of the year saw the circulation of a proposal from some members of “Taqadum’s” leadership body to declare an explicit alliance with the Rapid Support Forces as they fight for the restoration of democracy and civilian rule, which alarmed some members of “Taqadum” Given the public outcry to the militia’s repeated transgressions. However, it appears that the statement accusing the army of disrupting the Djibouti meeting and the Hamdok-Hemedti agreement was sent to clear the way for the gradual announcement of this alliance.

In overall, the militia did not disappoint those who had mistrust in it after signing the agreement and demonstrated that the agreement is nothing more than ink on paper without a genuine political will to follow it. The day after the deal was signed, RSF established a siege and barred residents from leaving the Bant district of Omdurman, and it returned families who sought to flee to safer places. Its forces are also advancing on the city of Al-Faw in Gedaref State, causing widespread fear in the region of a repeat of the scenario of the Wad Madani assault in Al-Gezira State. Its forces also stormed Habila in West Darfur state on Thursday, January 4, two days after the deal was signed. All of this news, as well as the abuses that accompany it, have been overshadowed by news of the deal that ostensibly paves the road for peace in Sudan. When asked about the commitments that the militia made to itself in the agreement, the media “readiness” rooms, which the militia’s supporters and “Taqadum” supporters have openly shared, have repeatedly stated that they will not be implemented until the second party (the army) signs the agreement! which is an agreement that includes the previously discussed political provisions and comes in the form of taking it all or leaving it all.

Taqadum intellectuals, such as Dr. Suliman Baldo, who had previously openly condemned the militia’s violations and atrocities, actively engaged in defending the Hamdok-Hemedti agreement and touting it as a huge breakthrough that would spark a positive motion in Sudan. None of them pointed to the omissions, logical and political flaws in this agreement. Rather, all of these intellectuals participated in the most extensive mind manipulation and gaslighting process in order to promote the agreement. This trend highlighted a serious fault in the consciousness of those intellectuals who want to keep a particular sort of relationship with political authority, which does not have to be with the state apparatus. They saw their place at the “Taqadum” table as a sufficient price to stand up and support what its politicians were doing, even if it meant lying and manipulating their people.
The reality now is that the militia is holding Sudanese captive in order to carry out its political objectives, and that “Taqadum” has now joined it (out of fear or greed) in legitimizing this captivity. The correct national thesis is one of a political solution to end the war. Stopping this insane conflict must be everyone’s sole national priority at this time. However, the political solution does not entail giving over the country to the militia in accordance with the “rule of those who conquer” strategy. Rather, it should be the correct political solution that addresses the core causes of the problem and the crisis, which are the country’s multiple military institutions, their engagement in politics, and their corruption.

It is impossible to accept the continued existence of the Rapid Support Militia’s institutional presence, just as it is impossible to accept the continuation of the army in its current state. This will not be a solution, but rather an authoritarian bargain gambling with the country’s future, submitting to this blackmail with weapons and war in order to postpone the crisis, and seeking political gains from the people’s suffering and the war that killed, displaced, and raped our sons and daughters.

The prospect of the Rapid Support Forces remaining in politics or being given positions in the military services’ leadership is simply “political naivety and decadence.” The criminal and usurper cannot be trusted with the state’s lawful violence apparatus. Similarly, the exposure of the state of the armed forces, whose flaws became apparent, demonstrating the extent of the corruption that years of Islamization and empowerment had left in them, as well as the validity and necessity of reforming Sudan’s military and security establishment.
The correct political alternative to end the war is one that clearly secures the dissolution of the militia and its end as an independent institution, rather than its merger into army leadership, and includes significant reform in the Sudanese military institution.
Negotiation does not entail entertaining both parties’ goals and hoping to please them, but rather attempting to establish sound principles and pillars for rebuilding the Sudanese state.