Dr. Elshafie Khidir Saeed
17 January 2024

A number of indicators shaped our four conclusions about the ongoing Sudanese War. It is possible that some of them are inaccurate, and I earnestly wish that they turn to be incorrect, particularly given that they were constructed using a variety of indicators as opposed to information.
The first conclusion is that it is highly improbable that the war in Sudan will be ended soon, and that neither peace nor security will be restored in the foreseeable future.
The second conclusion is that governments on both the regional and global levels appear to have little interest in putting an end to the ongoing war in Sudan quickly as attainable, preferring instead to see it continue for a longer period of time.
The third conclusion that it is evident that the Sudan war has the potential to escalate and ignite conflicts throughout the region, possibly even leading to a regional or global war.
The fourth conclusion is that the war has transformed Sudan into a highly conducive environment for transcontinental terrorist organizations to flourish.
In order to avoid being labeled as pessimistic and criticized for these statements, we will examine several indicators that support these four conclusions.
One of the signs pointing towards a prolonged war is the apparent lack of will from both sides involved in the conflict to stop the fighting, suggesting that the final decision may not solely rest in their control. Taking a closer look at their inconsistent behavior on the Jeddah and IGAD platforms reveals this.
The history of conflicts and battles around the world teaches us that any military confrontations that are not resolved in the first few days or weeks will last for a long time, and the longer the period, the less likely the possibilities of reaching a permanent truce become. The longer the fighting lasts, the more central leadership loses control of their troops who begin to behave like bandits. Some are attempting to resolve old conflicts over resources in a specific area, and these, along with fighters from outside Sudan, frequently want the war to continue because it is the source of their income. With demands for mobilization and armed popular resistance, the tribal nature of the battle is growing, racist and hate discourse is on the rise, and killing based on identity and political affiliation is becoming more common. This is challenging to control and will either prolong or reignite the war unless the underlying reasons are addressed. The unity of the civil force is weakening, and the influence of foreign agenda is becoming more prominent among them, making it difficult for them to find a solution to end the war.
The second conclusion is that governments, both within the region and globally, have a vested interest in the prolonged continuation of the war, rather than seeking a swift resolution. This is clearly demonstrated by the following indicators: The ongoing supply of weapons to both sides, from countries in the region and around the world, without any attempt to prevent it by global powers, only serves to fuel the ongoing war. The lands of Sudan hold valuable resources that are in high demand worldwide. But perhaps more importantly is its remarkable fertility and ample water resources. These qualities have positioned it as one of the solutions being embraced globally to address the pressing food crisis that is currently affecting the world and is projected to worsen by 2050. In a report released in 2004 by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), titled “Post Conflict Sudan” Sudan was characterized as a failed state that has experienced significant challenges and requires restructuring and reform, potentially through the acquisition of its lands, even indirectly. Thus, the ongoing conflict signifies a persistent pattern of failure, ultimately leading to the fragmentation and division of Sudan into different countries. Sudan seems to hold a significant role in the plan to reorganize the region according to the “New Middle East” project. The project’s implementation relies on fostering a state of Creative Chaos in the region, particularly in Sudan. The creative chaos serves dividing Sudan into weak and conflicting religious and sectarian states. The lack of will to stop the war plays into the hands of this plan. Aside from statements and condemnations, there is a lack of robust backing to stopping the war from countries and influential international circles, particularly from the United States of America.
The third conclusion, regarding the potential for the war to escalate and spread regionally and globally, was derived from the following indicators: Sudan’s strategic geo-political position poses a risk of the conflict spilling over into neighboring countries that are already grappling with delicate infrastructure, tensions, and unstable security. Some authoritarian regimes in power have been known to utilize armed organizations like Wagner Group to further their own agendas. This raise concerns that if Wagner were to engage in conflict with other armed groups, it could potentially escalate tensions in the region as power struggles ensue. If the war continues, it could escalate into a major regional conflict, potentially involving other countries with interests in the region. This is due to the strategic interests at play between Western nations, such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and their opposition to the interests of China and Russia in the region. All countries across the world are deeply concerned about the security of the Red Sea, where ongoing conflicts involve the participation of multiple countries. Several countries are competing to establish military bases along Sudan’s extensive Red Sea coastline, with each of these countries having connections to both sides of the war.
The fourth conclusion is regarding the potential for war to create an ideal fertile ground for transnational terrorist organizations. Originally in Sudan and most of the countries of the region, there are dormant terrorist cells awaiting an opportunity, and the instability in Sudan is providing them with just that. One consequence of the war is the proliferation of light weapons and their illegal trade, facilitated by the creation of new smuggling routes that traverse various countries surrounding Sudan. The precarious situation along the border heightens the potential for weapons in contested regions to end up in hands that are not intended, potentially inspiring other armed groups sharing similar political and ideological objectives to emulate this scenario. The ongoing increase in displacement and asylum in a context of widespread poverty and lack of basic care creates favorable circumstances for armed organizations to recruit individuals from vulnerable populations.
Emphasizing these possible consequences and their negative impacts does not suggest surrender, as it is not an option for the Sudanese people. Instead, it should serve as a powerful source of inspiration and motivation for Sudanese civil forces to present a strong vision to bring an end to the war.